A Vedānta Refutation of Acintya-bhedābheda
A Viśiṣṭādvaitic Pūrvapakṣa-khaṇḍana of the Doctrine of Inconceivable Difference-and-Non-difference
I. The Pūrvapakṣa
There are some who, wishing to preserve the reality of Bhagavān, the jīva, and the world, and wishing also to preserve the śruti-passages that speak of non-difference, teach that the Supreme Lord and His śaktis are simultaneously different and non-different, and, because this simultaneous difference and non-difference cannot be grasped by ordinary reason, they call it acintya-bhedābheda, “inconceivable difference-and-non-difference.”
This doctrine is not to be dismissed without examination, for it arises from a genuine concern, namely, that sheer difference would make the world and souls independent of Brahman, while sheer identity would dissolve the reality of devotion, servitude, lordship, bondage, liberation, and divine grace, and therefore the proponents of this view seek a middle teaching in which Bhagavān remains the whole, the jīva remains His servant, the world remains real, and yet all things are said to be non-separate from Him.
In the Gauḍīya tradition, Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī is presented as accepting acintya-bhedābheda-vāda, and the Sarva-saṃvādinī passage commonly cited in this connection says in substance that because śakti cannot be conceived as wholly non-different from the svarūpa, difference is perceived, and because it cannot be conceived as wholly different from the svarūpa, non-difference is perceived, and thus between śakti and śaktimān both difference and non-difference are accepted as acintya.
Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, in the Govinda-bhāṣya, likewise states that the liberated jīva does not become equal to Brahman in every respect, but becomes similar in quality and consciousness, and he explicitly identifies this qualitative similarity and quantitative difference as the foundation of acintya-bhedābheda-tattva. (Wisdom Library)
Again, while commenting on Brahma-sūtra 2.1.6, Baladeva says that everything is an expansion either of Kṛṣṇa Himself or of His potency, that potency is non-different from the potent, śakti-śaktimatayor abhedaḥ, yet cit and acit are not to be artificially made one, and he gives the example of fire and heat, which interpenetrate and cannot be separated, while still being different. (Wisdom Library)
Thus the opponent’s view, fairly stated, is this: Bhagavān is the supreme śaktimān, the jīva and jagat are His śaktis, śakti cannot be absolutely different from śaktimān because then divine sovereignty and dependence would be lost, nor can śakti be absolutely identical with śaktimān because then the plurality of souls and world, as well as līlā, devotion, bondage, and liberation, would be unintelligible, and hence śakti and śaktimān must be accepted as both different and non-different, and since this cannot be brought under ordinary categories of relation, the relation is called acintya.
Such is the pūrvapakṣa.
Now it is examined.
II. The First Defect: The Doctrine Does Not Determine the Respect in Which Difference and Non-difference Are Asserted
When the opponent says that Brahman and His śakti are both different and non-different, it must be asked whether these two predicates, bheda and abheda, are asserted in the same respect or in different respects, for if they are asserted in the same respect, then the proposition is self-canceling, since bheda means “this is not that,” while abheda means “this is not other than that,” and no meaningful cognition can arise from a sentence in which the same subject, in the same respect, is said both to be and not to be the same object.
If it is said that the predicates are not asserted in the same respect, but in different respects, then the doctrine has already ceased to require the refuge of acintyatva, for whatever is one in one respect and different in another respect is not a contradiction but an intelligible relation, as when a body is one with the self in being the self’s body and wholly dependent on it, while different from the self in being controlled, supported, and used by it, or as when an attribute is inseparable from a substance while not being identical with the substance in every mode of predication, or as when an effect has no independent existence apart from its cause while not being numerically the same as the cause in its manifest condition.
Thus, if the opponent refuses to distinguish the respects, he accepts contradiction; if he distinguishes the respects, he abandons the need for acintya-bhedābheda as a special doctrine and enters the domain of ordinary sambandha-vicāra, where Viśiṣṭādvaita already provides the complete and non-defective account.
III. The Second Defect: “Acintya” Is Not a Sambandha
If it is said that the relation between Brahman and śakti is neither samavāya, nor saṃyoga, nor dharma-dharmī-bhāva, nor viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva, nor śarīra-śarīrī-bhāva, nor apṛthak-siddhi, but simply acintya, then such a reply is only a confession that the relation has not been explained, for acintya indicates the inability of the finite mind to comprehend something exhaustively, but it does not itself state what the thing is.
When a person is asked, “What is the relation between this and that?” and he replies, “It is inconceivable,” he has not given a relation, but has named his own inability to bring the relation under a known category, and while such humility may be acceptable in devotional speech, it cannot serve as a darśanic determination of tattva.
For the śāstras do indeed teach that Bhagavān has powers beyond the reach of ordinary thought, and Baladeva himself, in Govinda-bhāṣya 1.2.33, cites scriptural support for the Lord’s inconceivable potency, including the idea that the Lord has acintya-śakti and atarkya-sahasra-śakti, innumerable powers beyond ordinary reasoning. (Wisdom Library)
But from the fact that Bhagavān possesses powers not exhaustively comprehended by the finite intellect, it does not follow that contradictory predications may be asserted in the same respect, for “inconceivable” may deny the adequacy of finite comprehension, but it cannot deny the conditions by which a sentence becomes meaningful; otherwise, even the statement “Bhagavān has acintya-śakti” would become indistinguishable from “Bhagavān does not have acintya-śakti,” and the very śabda by which the doctrine is taught would lose its force.
IV. The Third Defect: The Appeal to Acintya-śakti Leads Either to Circularity or Infinite Regress
The opponent may say that the relation between Brahman and His jñāna, or between Brahman and His śakti, or between Brahman and the jīva, is not to be explained by ordinary relation, for the Supreme possesses acintya-śakti, by which the apparently opposed states of difference and non-difference are made possible.
But then it must be asked: what is the relation between Brahman and this acintya-śakti itself?
If acintya-śakti is absolutely identical with Brahman, then it cannot serve as a distinct explanatory principle, for the statement “Brahman and His jñāna are one and different because of acintya-śakti” reduces to “Brahman and His jñāna are one and different because of Brahman,” which is merely repetition of the thesis and not an explanation of the relation.
If acintya-śakti is absolutely different from Brahman, then Brahman becomes dependent upon a principle other than Himself in order to explain His own nature and His own relation to His powers, and this destroys Brahman’s absolute independence.
If it is said that acintya-śakti inheres in Brahman through samavāya, then the objection already used by Bhagavad Rāmānuja against the Vaiśeṣika category of samavāya applies here also, for in the Śrī-bhāṣya treatment of Brahma-sūtra 2.2.12, samavāya is rejected because, if a relation is required to connect inseparable entities, then that relation itself must be connected to the relata, and if a further relation is required, there is infinite regress, while if no further relation is required, the first postulated relation was unnecessary. (Wisdom Library)
If it is then said that Brahman and acintya-śakti are themselves related by acintya-bhedābheda, then the same question arises again: by what is that bhedābheda established; if by another acintya-śakti, then another relation must be explained, and thus the regress proceeds without end; if by the same acintya-śakti, then the doctrine becomes circular, for acintya-śakti explains bhedābheda only because it itself is bhedābheda, and its own bhedābheda is explained only by itself.
Thus the appeal to acintya-śakti does not remove the difficulty, but only moves it one step backward, and what was first asserted between Brahman and the jīva is now asserted between Brahman and acintya-śakti, with no gain in intelligibility.
V. The Fourth Defect: The Argument from “Neither Pure Difference Nor Pure Identity” Does Not Establish Acintya-bhedābheda
Jīva Gosvāmī’s reasoning, as commonly presented, has a genuine insight: śakti cannot be treated as utterly separate from śaktimān, for then Bhagavān would not be the inner ground and controller of all, nor can śakti be treated as simply identical with śaktimān, for then the plurality of the world, souls, divine attributes, and divine activities would be erased.
But from the rejection of absolute difference and absolute identity, it does not follow that one must accept simultaneous real difference and real identity in the same respect; rather, what follows is that the relation must be one of inseparable dependence, where the dependent reality has no independent existence apart from Brahman, while remaining distinct as His mode, attribute, body, or controlled entity.
This is precisely the Viśiṣṭādvaitic solution, which, without denying śruti, without violating logic, and without dissolving devotion, teaches that Brahman is the one independent reality, while cit and acit are real, distinct, dependent, inseparable modes of Him, standing to Him as body to self, as that which is supported, controlled, and used by the indwelling Lord.
The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad’s Antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa repeatedly declares that the earth, waters, fire, air, space, beings, mind, intellect, and all entities are the body of the inner ruler — yasya pṛthivī śarīram, yasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni śarīram — and that He, dwelling within, controls them from within.
Here the śruti does not teach that the world is numerically identical with Brahman, nor that it is utterly separate from Him, nor that contradiction is to be worshiped as tattva, but that all things are His body, He is their inner self, and the relation is one of dependence, support, control, inseparability, and subservience.
Thus the very problem that Acintya-bhedābheda attempts to solve is already solved by the śruti-given relation of śarīra-śarīrī-bhāva, and therefore the doctrine of acintya-bhedābheda is not needed.
VI. The Fifth Defect: “Qualitative Similarity and Quantitative Difference” Establishes Sādharmya, Not Abheda
Baladeva says that the liberated jīva becomes similar to Brahman in quality and consciousness, but not equal in every way, especially not quantitatively, and he calls this the foundation of acintya-bhedābheda. (Wisdom Library)
But this statement, if examined carefully, establishes not identity but similarity.
For when two things share a quality, they are not thereby numerically one; fire and a spark both possess heat, but the spark is not the fire-source; the ocean and a drop both possess liquidity and saltiness, but the drop is not the ocean; the sun and its ray both shine, but the ray is not the solar orb; a cow and a horse both possess existence, knowability, and objecthood, yet no one says that a cow is a horse.
Shared quality is sādharmya, not tādātmya.
If the jīva is said to be similar to Brahman in consciousness, then the jīva is conscious and Brahman is conscious, but the jīva is not Brahman; if the jīva is said to be quantitatively different, then real difference has already been admitted; if “abheda” is then introduced only because both possess consciousness, the word abheda has been weakened into similarity.
Thus Baladeva’s own formulation, taken strictly, does not establish bhedābheda, but bheda with sādharmya, difference accompanied by resemblance, which is perfectly acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita and requires no acintya doctrine.
VII. The Sixth Defect: The Fire-and-Heat Example Proves Attribute-Substratum Relation, Not Contradictory Identity-and-Difference
Baladeva gives the example of fire and heat, saying that where there is fire there is heat, and where there is heat there is fire, and though they are one, they are different. (Wisdom Library)
But this example, when carefully understood, proves the opposite of what is intended.
Heat is not a second fire standing independently of fire, nor is fire exhausted by the abstract property of heat; heat is the power, property, or attribute of fire, and fire is the bearer of that heat, and therefore the proper relation is intelligible as dharma-dharmī-bhāva or śakti-śaktimān-bhāva understood as inseparable dependence, not as a simultaneous contradiction.
If the example is pressed literally, the opponent must say that heat is identical with fire and also different from fire in the same respect, which is impossible; if he says that heat is identical in the sense of inseparability and different in the sense of conceptual or functional distinction, then he has granted that the relation is intelligible and does not require acintya.
Thus the fire-heat illustration does not establish acintya-bhedābheda; it establishes that an attribute or power may be inseparable from its possessor without being identical to it in every respect, which is already accommodated by Viśiṣṭādvaita.
VIII. The Seventh Defect: The Śakti-śaktimān Formula Is Ambiguous and Therefore Cannot Bear the Weight Placed Upon It
The statement śakti-śaktimatayor abhedaḥ, “there is non-difference between śakti and śaktimān,” may be accepted if it means that śakti has no independent existence apart from śaktimān, that śakti is wholly dependent upon śaktimān, and that śaktimān alone is the ultimate ground of śakti.
But if this formula is made to mean that śakti is numerically identical with śaktimān in the very same respect in which it is distinct from Him, then the statement becomes contradictory.
If śakti is absolutely identical with śaktimān, then the distinction between possessor and possessed becomes meaningless; if śakti is absolutely different from śaktimān, then śaktimān is no longer the inseparable ground of śakti; if śakti is inseparably dependent on śaktimān while remaining a real attribute, mode, or body, then the relation is Viśiṣṭādvaitic in structure and needs no acintya-bhedābheda.
Therefore the śakti-śaktimān formula cannot prove the doctrine unless its meaning is first fixed, and once its meaning is fixed coherently, it either becomes inseparable dependence or collapses into contradiction.
IX. The Eighth Defect: Brahman’s Jñāna Cannot Be Made Both Different and Non-different Without Harm
If the opponent says that Brahman and His jñāna are also simultaneously one and different, then the word jñāna must be examined.
If jñāna means Brahman’s essential consciousness, then real difference between Brahman and jñāna is impossible, for if Brahman is truly different from His essential consciousness, then Brahman in Himself is not conscious and becomes a substrate to which consciousness is externally attached, like color to a pot, which is wholly inadmissible in Vedānta, for Brahman is not a jaḍa-dravya qualified by a later-added cognition, but intrinsically conscious, self-luminous, and all-knowing.
If jñāna means attributive knowledge, then the relation is intelligible as dharma-dharmī-bhāva, for Brahman is the possessor of infinite knowledge and His knowledge is inseparable from Him, dependent on Him, and expressive of His nature, and thus no acintya-bhedābheda is required.
If it is said that Brahman’s jñāna is identical with Brahman, then no bheda remains in that case, and jñāna cannot be used to establish bhedābheda.
If it is said that jñāna is different from Brahman, then Brahman is made different from His own consciousness, and His essential nature is damaged.
If it is said that jñāna is identical and different in the same respect, the contradiction returns.
If it is said that jñāna is identical in one respect and different in another, then the respects must be stated, and when they are stated the matter becomes intelligible as a relation between substance and attribute, svarūpa and dharma, knower and knowledge, and the word acintya is unnecessary.
Thus the jñāna example is not a support for Acintya-bhedābheda, but a test by which its weakness is exposed.
X. The Ninth Defect: Divine Omnipotence Does Not Make Contradiction Meaningful
If it is said that Bhagavān, being omnipotent, can make difference and non-difference coexist in the same respect, the reply is that omnipotence means the capacity to do all that belongs to supreme lordship and all that is genuinely possible, not the capacity to make self-canceling words meaningful.
For “to make a square circle,” “to make a finite infinite in the same respect,” “to make the same thing wholly identical and wholly non-identical in the same respect,” are not acts awaiting sufficient power, but verbal formations in which the predicate destroys the subject.
Bhagavān can create, sustain, dissolve, enter, rule, liberate, reveal, conceal, manifest infinite forms, possess infinite auspicious qualities, and remain untouched by all defects, but He does not become glorified by saying that He makes contradiction true, for contradiction is not a superhuman act but the absence of coherent meaning.
Thus omnipotence cannot be invoked to make acintya-bhedābheda valid if that doctrine means same-respect identity and difference.
XI. The Tenth Defect: If Logic Is Rejected, the Doctrine Cannot Be Defended by Logic or Scripture Either
If the opponent says that ordinary logic cannot touch Bhagavān, this may be accepted in the limited sense that Bhagavān is not exhausted by finite inference, but if it is said that the basic rules of meaningful predication do not apply to any statement concerning Bhagavān, then no siddhānta remains possible.
For the statements “Kṛṣṇa is supreme,” “Bhagavān has acintya-śakti,” “the jīva is His servant,” “bhakti is the means,” “śāstra is pramāṇa,” and “Acintya-bhedābheda is true,” all require that the subject be distinguished from what is not the subject, that the predicate exclude its negation, and that a sentence convey a determinate meaning.
If logic is wholly rejected, then the sentence “Kṛṣṇa is supreme” does not exclude “Kṛṣṇa is not supreme,” and “the jīva is Bhagavān’s servant” does not exclude “the jīva is not Bhagavān’s servant,” and thus the very theology the opponent wishes to protect is destroyed.
Therefore yukti is not an enemy of Vedānta, but a servant of śruti, and reason is not permitted to overrule revelation, but neither may the name of revelation be used to destroy the very conditions by which revelation teaches.
XII. The Eleventh Defect: The Śāstra Does Not Teach Contradiction, But a Coherent Relation of Brahman, Cit, and Acit
The śruti says sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam, “Being alone was this in the beginning, one only without a second,” and it also says tat tvam asi, “that thou art,” and these passages teach the non-independent existence of all things apart from Brahman and the presence of Brahman as the self of all. (Wisdom Library)
The same śruti also teaches the inner rulership of Brahman over all things, saying repeatedly in the Antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa that He stands within earth, waters, fire, beings, mind, intellect, and all entities, that they do not know Him, that they are His body, and that He controls them from within.
The Bhagavad-gītā teaches that the Lord has an inferior prakṛti consisting of earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intellect, and ahaṅkāra, and a superior prakṛti consisting of the jīvas by which the world is sustained, thus clearly distinguishing cit and acit while grounding both in Bhagavān. (Wisdom Library)
Again the Gītā says mamaivāṁśo jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ, that the jīva is the Lord’s eternal aṁśa, and this cannot mean a spatial fragment cut from Brahman, for Brahman is indivisible, nor can it mean absolute identity, for the very same verse speaks of the jīva struggling with mind and senses in prakṛti, which cannot belong to the Supreme Lord.
Thus śāstra teaches neither absolute separateness nor crude identity nor irrational contradiction, but dependent inseparability, real distinction, and divine inner rulership.
The non-difference statements teach that nothing exists independently of Brahman, that Brahman is the material and efficient ground of the universe, that all beings are His body, and that He is the Self of all; the difference statements teach that the jīva is not Īśvara, that the world is not Brahman’s pure svarūpa, that bondage belongs to the jīva, and that the Lord is the controller, supporter, and end of all.
Viśiṣṭādvaita alone preserves all these statements without violence.
XIII. The Twelfth Defect: The Jīva’s Bondage and the World’s Defects Cannot Be Put in Brahman by Real Identity
If the jīva is truly non-different from Brahman in the sense of identity, then the jīva’s ignorance, limitation, suffering, karma, bondage, and need for liberation would belong to Brahman.
If the world is truly non-different from Brahman in the sense of identity, then change, decay, impurity, and limitation would touch Brahman.
If the opponent says that these defects belong only to the Lord’s external energy and not to His svarūpa, then he has already admitted a meaningful distinction between Brahman’s pure nature and the dependent modes or energies, and this distinction must be explained.
If he says the distinction is real, then abheda cannot mean identity.
If he says the distinction is unreal, then the world and bondage lose reality.
If he says the distinction is acintya, he has not explained why the defects do not touch Brahman, but only prevented the question from being answered.
Viśiṣṭādvaita avoids this difficulty by teaching that cit and acit are Brahman’s body, and that their changes and defects belong to them as dependent modes, not to Brahman’s essential nature, just as the self may have a body that undergoes childhood, youth, age, and disease without the self’s essential sentience becoming identical with those bodily defects.
Thus the world is real, the jīva is real, bondage is real, liberation is real, Bhagavān is untouched, and the śruti teaching of non-separateness is preserved.
XIV. The Thirteenth Defect: “Aṁśa” Cannot Mean Fragmentation of Brahman
When the Gītā calls the jīva Bhagavān’s aṁśa, this cannot mean that Brahman is broken into parts, for that which is composed of parts depends on parts, and that which depends on parts cannot be the absolute Brahman.
Nor can aṁśa mean that the jīva is numerically identical with Īśvara, for the jīva struggles in prakṛti, is bound by karma, and attains liberation by the grace of the Lord, whereas Īśvara is the controller of prakṛti, the giver of karma-phala, and the liberator.
Therefore aṁśa must mean a dependent mode, owned reality, śeṣa, prakāra, or body, in which the jīva belongs wholly to Bhagavān, exists for Him, is sustained by Him, and has no independent being apart from Him.
This is Viśiṣṭādvaita.
There is no need to introduce acintya-bhedābheda when the word aṁśa is perfectly explained by śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva and śarīra-śarīrī-bhāva.
XV. The Fourteenth Defect: The Jaina Objection Returns If Contradictory Predication Is Accepted
It is not necessary to say that Acintya-bhedābheda is historically identical with Jaina saptabhaṅgī, for that would be careless, but the logical vulnerability is similar if contradictory predicates are affirmed of one entity in the same respect.
The Vedāntins rejected the Jaina doctrine where mutually opposed predicates such as existence and non-existence are applied to the same entity without sufficient distinction of standpoint, and the objection is not that reality cannot be complex, but that complexity must not be purchased by the destruction of determinate predication.
If the Acintya-bhedābhedin says that the jīva is Brahman and is not Brahman in the same respect, he falls under the same defect.
If he says that the jīva is Brahman in one respect and not Brahman in another respect, he must state those respects.
When those respects are stated coherently, the doctrine becomes reducible to dependent inseparability and real distinction, which is Viśiṣṭādvaita in substance, not acintya-bhedābheda as an independent siddhānta.
XVI. The Fifteenth Defect: The Doctrine Oscillates Between Advaita, Dvaita, and Viśiṣṭādvaita Without Securing Its Own Principle
When Acintya-bhedābheda wishes to emphasize divine unity, it says that śakti is non-different from śaktimān; when it wishes to protect devotion and plurality, it says that śakti is different from śaktimān; when asked how both can be real, it says that the relation is acintya; when asked what acintya means, it appeals to Bhagavān’s inconceivable power; when asked how that power is related to Bhagavān, the same bhedābheda is asserted again.
Thus the doctrine moves in a circle.
If abheda is made strong, it approaches Advaita and risks contaminating Brahman with the defects of the world and the bondage of the jīva.
If bheda is made strong, it approaches Dvaita and the abheda passages become only similarity, causality, or dependence.
If inseparable dependence is admitted, it approaches Viśiṣṭādvaita and the acintya doctrine becomes unnecessary.
Therefore the doctrine survives only by not allowing its key term to be analyzed; once analyzed, it either collapses into contradiction or is absorbed into a more precise system.
XVII. Viśiṣṭādvaita as the Complete Resolution
The perfect resolution is this: Brahman, who is Śrīman Nārāyaṇa, is the one independent reality, possessed of infinite auspicious attributes, free from all defects, the material and efficient cause of the universe, the inner self of all, the controller of all, and the supreme end of all; cit and acit are real and eternal in their substantive nature, though subject to contraction, expansion, bondage, liberation, manifestation, and unmanifestation according to their own category; and these cit and acit, being wholly supported, controlled, and purposed by Brahman, constitute His body, while He is their indwelling self.
This relation is not external conjunction, for cit and acit cannot exist apart from Brahman. It is not absolute identity, for the jīva is not Īśvara and the world is not Brahman’s pure svarūpa. It is not contradiction, because the respects are clear. It is not samavāya in the Vaiśeṣika sense, because the body-self relation is directly established by śruti and does not require an unseen relation standing between two independent substances. It is not mere metaphor, because the Antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa repeatedly says yasya pṛthivī śarīram, yasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni śarīram, and extends the same structure across the whole range of reality.
It preserves abheda, because nothing exists apart from Brahman, all things are His body, all words ultimately denote Him as the inner self of their objects, and He alone is the independent reality. It preserves bheda, because the body is not the self, the controlled is not the controller, the dependent is not the independent, the jīva is not Īśvara, and the world’s defects do not touch Brahman’s svarūpa. It preserves bhakti, because the servant is real and the Lord is real. It preserves mokṣa, because the jīva does not disappear into identity but attains the Lord, serves Him, enjoys Him, and realizes its own nature. It preserves śruti, because both difference and non-difference passages are interpreted without contradiction. It preserves yukti, because no self-canceling predicate is accepted. It preserves Bhagavān’s perfection, because Brahman remains untouched by the defects of cit and acit while being their inner ruler and support.
What, then, remains for Acintya-bhedābheda to accomplish?
If it means dependence, Viśiṣṭādvaita has already taught it. If it means inseparability, Viśiṣṭādvaita has already taught it. If it means body-self relation, Viśiṣṭādvaita has already taught it. If it means similarity of conscious nature, Viśiṣṭādvaita has already taught it. If it means real difference, Viśiṣṭādvaita has already taught it. If it means real identity in the same respect as real difference, it is contradiction.
Thus the doctrine is either unnecessary or impossible.
XVIII. Conclusion
Acintya-bhedābheda begins from a real concern, for it rightly sees that absolute separation of jīva and jagat from Bhagavān is unacceptable, and that crude identity of jīva and Bhagavān is equally unacceptable, but because it does not accept the śruti-given and logically complete relation of śarīra-śarīrī-bhāva, it is forced to say that the relation is simultaneously difference and non-difference and that this simultaneity is acintya.
But the word acintya, though fit to glorify the immeasurable majesty of Bhagavān, is not fit to replace sambandha-vicāra.
The Lord’s nature is indeed beyond the full reach of mind and speech, but the sentences of śāstra are not meaningless; His powers are indeed countless and wondrous, but they do not turn contradiction into tattva; His relation to the world is indeed intimate and inseparable, but that relation is already declared by śruti as the relation of inner self and body.
Therefore the doctrine that cit and acit are the real, dependent, inseparable body of Brahman, and that Brahman is their inner self, controller, support, and end, alone preserves the whole teaching without remainder.
Here there is no need to deny difference, no need to deny non-separateness, no need to attribute defects to Brahman, no need to reduce the jīva to illusion, no need to make the world independent, no need to invoke contradiction, and no need to hide the absence of a sambandha under the word acintya.
For this reason, the system of Bhagavad Rāmānuja stands complete: it accepts the śruti of unity, the śruti of plurality, the reality of devotion, the supremacy of Nārāyaṇa, the dependence of the jīva, the reality of the world, the purity of Brahman, and the intelligibility of śāstra, while Acintya-bhedābheda, when pressed by reason, either becomes contradiction, or becomes similarity, or becomes dependence, or becomes Viśiṣṭādvaita under another name.
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